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1 The concept of high-powered
money used in this section is
slightly broader than the con-
cept used by Friedman and
Schwartz (1963).
2 This concept also is widely
referred to as the source base;
see for example Andersen and
Jordan (1968). Our usage con-
forms to the earlier practice of
labeling it “the monetary
base.”
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he adjusted monetary base is an index
that measures the effects on a central
bank’s balance sheet of its open
market operations, discount window
lending, unsterilized foreign exchange
market intervention, and changes in statu-
tory reserve requirements. Such an index
is important because the long-run path of
a monetary economy’s price level is
primarily determined by the path of the
central bank’s balance sheet, adjusted for
the effects of changes in statutory reserve
requirements.
The St. Louis 
 
adjusted monetary base
equals the sum of the monetary (or source)
base and the reserve adjustment magnitude
(RAM). This article presents a revised
measure of the monetary base and a 
new RAM. The revised measure of the
monetary base differs from previous mea-
sures by including all Federal Reserve
Bank deposits held by domestic depository
institutions; previous measures have
excluded the aggregate amount of deposi-
tory institutions’ required clearing balance
contracts with Federal Reserve Banks. The
new RAM recognizes that, since the Mone-
tary Control Act of 1980, an increasing
proportion of depository institutions have
not signiﬁcantly changed their demand for
base money (vault cash and deposits at
Federal Reserve Banks) relative to transac-
tions deposits following changes in
statutory reserve requirements. Previous
RAM adjustments have assumed that
depository institutions would match
changes in their statutory required
reserves about dollar-for-dollar with
changes in their holdings of base money,
following a change in reserve-requirement
ratios. The new RAM, constructed from 
ﬁfteen years of weekly data on more than
10,000 individual depository institutions,
measures more precisely the change in 
the amount of base money demanded by
depositories following changes in reserve-
requirement ratios than did previous RAM
adjustments based on aggregate data. 
THE REVISED MONETARY
BASE
The measure of the monetary base that
was published by the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis through September 1996
included most, but not all, deposits at 
Federal Reserve Banks held by domestic
depository institutions. The new measure,
presented in this article and published by
the Bank since October 1996, includes all
such deposits. The revision increases the
level of the base by an amount that varies
from zero in 1980 up to about $6 billion in
1994 and 1996.
Sources and uses of high-powered
money for the U.S. economy in December
1995 are shown in Table 1.
1 Most of the
high-powered money supplied by the Fed-
eral Reserve and the Treasury is repre-
sented by currency in circulation and the
deposits of domestic ﬁnancial institutions
at Federal Reserve Banks; together, these
constitute the monetary base.
2 The old
measure of the St. Louis monetary base
(line 6) equals the sum of currency in cir-
culation outside the Treasury and Federal
Reserve (line 6a) plus the “reserve
balances” of depository institutions (line
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6b). Reserve balances, measured by
subtracting the aggregate amount of
depository institutions’ required clearing
balance contracts from their aggregate
Federal Reserve deposits, is an accounting
concept intended to measure the aggregate
amount of high-powered money available
to support deposit expansion. Uses of high-
powered money other than as the monetary
base, including their use to satisfy required
clearing balance contracts, were about $25
billion in December 1995 (line 7).
The new measure of the monetary
base (line 8) equals the sum of currency in
circulation (line 8a) plus all Federal
Reserve deposits held by domestic deposi-
tory institutions (line 8b). The new
measure recognizes the similarity between
the Federal Reserve deposits classiﬁed as
reserves balances (line 6b) and those 
classiﬁed as held to satisfy required
clearing balance contracts (line 7d). Both
categories of deposits are used by deposi-
tory institutions to settle interbank pay-
ments, and both are available to satisfy
legal reserve requirements (albeit perhaps
at the cost of failing to satisfy a required
clearing balance contract). Including in
the monetary base those Federal Reserve
deposits putatively held to satisfy required
clearing balance contracts increases the
amount of Federal Reserve deposits in the
base by about one-fourth.
Our new measure of the monetary
base is suggested by the deﬁnition of
Balbach and Burger (1976): 
... (the monetary base) can therefore
be identiﬁed in any monetary system
Table 1
Current and Revised Measures of the Monetary Base, December 1995*
Factors Supplying 
Base Money
(1) Reserve Bank credit
(a)Securities held by 
the Federal Reserve 387.132
(b) Loans to depository 
institutions    0.209
(c) Federal Reserve ﬂoat 1.223
(d) Other Federal Reserve 
assets 32.212
Total Reserve Bank credit 420.776
(2) Gold stock 11.050
(3) SDR certiﬁcates 10.168
(4) US Treasury currency and 
coin outstanding 23.969
Total supply of base 
money other than Reserve 
Bank credit 45.187
(5) Total supply of base money 465.963
* $ billions, not seasonally adjusted.
Components may not add to totals due to rounding.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Factors Using Base Money: Current
Measure of the Monetary Base
(6) The Monetary Base: 
Current Measure 
(a) Currency and coin 
in circulation 419.615
(b) Reserve balances of 
depository institutions at 
Federal Reserve Banks 20.402
Total monetary base 440.016
(7) Uses of base money other 
than as the monetary base
(a) Treasury cash holdings 0.271
(b) Deposits of other than 
domestic ﬁnancial institutions 
at Federal Reserve Banks 7.349
(c) Other Federal Reserve 
liabilities and capital 12.841
(d) Deposits, other than 
reserve balances, of domestic 
ﬁnancial institutions at Federal 
Reserve Banks, including 
contractual amount of 
required clearing balances 5.487
Total other factors using base 
money 25.947
Factors Using Base Money: Revised
Measure of the Monetary Base
(8) The Monetary Base: 
Revised Measure
(a) Currency and coin in 
circulation 419.615
(b) Deposits of ﬁnancial 
institutions at Federal 
Reserve Banks (revised 
measure) 25.888
Total monetary base 445.503
(9) Uses other than as the 
monetary base 
(a) Treasury cash 0.271
(b) Deposits of other than 
domestic ﬁnancial institutions 
at Federal Reserve Banks 7.349
(c) Other Federal Reserve 
liabilities and capital 12.841
Total other factors using base 
money (revised measure) 20.460  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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3 The revised measure of the
base, like previous measures,
excludes Federal Reserve
deposits held by the U.S.
Treasury and by foreign central
banks, included in lines 7b and
9b of Table 1. These deposits
are not used to make interbank
payments nor to discharge
debts of nongovernmental
units; see Advisory Committee
on Monetary Statistics (1976). 
4 Nonmember banks held small
amounts of Federal Reserve
deposits before 1980, appar-
ently used for clearing house
payments. The measure of the
monetary base proposed by
Brunner (1961) excluded
these deposits. The measures
constructed by Cagan (1965)
and Friedman and Schwartz
(1963, appendix A) include
(estimates of) these deposits.
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by ascertaining and summing the 
following:
1. those assets which the consolidated 
banking sector uses to settle 
interbank debt; and
2. those items, aside from bank liabili
ties, which are used as money;
and by the deﬁnition of the Advisory Com-
mission on Monetary Statistics (1976, p. 8):
With respect to monetary aggregates,
one basis for deﬁning such a total is 
to regard money as corresponding to
assets that are generally used to dis-
charge obligations and that are not the
explicit liability of nongovernmental
entities in the society. Traditionally,
such assets have corresponded to
specie. In the United States today 
they correspond primarily to the 
non-interest-bearing ﬁat issues of the
ultimate monetary authority. The
terms “high-powered money” and
“monetary base” have been used to
refer to this total. We shall refer to it 
as “the base.”
For the United States today the base
includes all currency outside the Fed-
eral Reserve and the Treasury plus all
bank deposits at Federal Reserve
Banks.
Although broader than the old
measure it replaces, the new measure of
the monetary base excludes an important
asset that these deﬁnitions suggest should
be included: the amount of intraday credit,
in the form of Federal Reserve deposits,
used by banks for interbank payments.
During 1994, such intraday deposits aver-
aged approximately $50 billion, or nearly
twice the close-of-business-day amount 
of Federal Reserve deposits included in 
the monetary base (see Richards, 1995, 
p. 1066). The major barrier to inclusion of
intraday deposits is the lack of timely pub-
lished data: close-of-business deposit
levels are published weekly on the Board
of Governors’ H.4.1 statistical release,
while intraday credit is not published in
any release.3
The need to revise the measure of the
monetary base arises from changes in U.S.
ﬁnancial markets since the Monetary Con-
trol Act of 1980. The Act signiﬁcantly
changed the demand for Federal Reserve
deposits. Prior to the Act, almost all
deposits at Federal Reserve Banks were
held by member banks of the Federal
Reserve System.4 Banks used these
balances both to satisfy reserve
requirements and to make payments on
behalf of customers. For most member
banks, the latter came “free”: the amount
of reserves that they were required to hold
against deposits was more than sufﬁcient
to satisfy any demands arising from inter-
bank payments (perhaps with some
intraday Federal Reserve overdraft credit).
Nonmember banks and thrifts, lacking
access to the Federal Reserve’s books for
ﬁnal settlement of payments, made
interbank payments and settled checks
through correspondent accounts at
member banks.
The Monetary Control Act made non-
member institutions subject to Federal
Reserve System reserve requirements and,
at the same time, gave them direct access
to the payments system through deposits
at the Federal Reserve Banks (see Gilbert
and Summers, 1996). Because the new
reserve requirements were phased in for
these institutions over an eight-year
period, many initially found their vault
cash more than sufﬁcient to satisfy the
requirements. Holding only small amounts
of Federal Reserve deposits, some institu-
tions found that overdrafts on Federal
Reserve accounts became a problem (see
Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1981, 
pp. 247-49 and December 1982, p. 756).
As a result, during the early 1980s the
Federal Reserve required some depository
institutions that used Federal Reserve pay-
ments services to maintain so-called
required clearing balances, or levels of Fed-
eral Reserve deposits above and beyond
the amounts necessary to satisfy the insti-
tutions’ statutory reserve requirements. To
offset the cost of holding these balances
and make the requirement more palatable,
the Federal Reserve paid the institutions,
at (approximately) the federal funds rate,
“earnings credits” that could be used onlyFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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5 Contrary to the terminology in
the quotation, required clearing
balances are not (and never
have been) included in pub-
lished Federal Reserve data on
reserve balances.
6 There is one exception to this
statement. A nonmember
depository institution may have
a separate clearing balance
deposit account at a Federal
Reserve Bank if it satisﬁes its
required reserves via a pass-
through contract with another
eligible depository institution. 
7 See Feinman (1993) and
Hilton, Cohen and Koonmen
(1993).
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1996
to defray charges for Federal Reserve
priced services such as check clearing and
wire transfers.
A clear statement of the rationale for
the exclusion of required clearing balances
from the current measure of the monetary
base is provided by Gilbert (1983), p. 23n:
Depository institutions maintain
clearing balances at Federal Reserve
Banks as a means of payment for the
fees Federal Reserve Banks now charge
for services. Depository institutions
receive implicit interest on their
clearing balances at the federal funds
rate, which may be used to pay the
fees on services. Required clearing bal-
ances are subtracted in computing the
[monetary] source base because
clearing balances are part of total
reserve balances held by depository
institutions at Federal Reserve Banks,
but are not related to the levels of
deposit liabilities.5
Perhaps reasonable at the time, the
required clearing balance contract has
evolved into a ﬂexible, voluntary tool of
depository institution cash management.
Although the contract obliges a depository
institution to maintain a larger Federal
Reserve deposit than is necessary to satisfy
its required reserves, the deposit is neither
a distinct type nor separate category of
deposit: all of the funds are available to
settle interbank payments and may be con-
verted to vault cash if necessary.
6
During the mid-1980s, and especially
following the February 1984 shift to con-
temporaneous reserve accounting, an
increasing number of institutions realized
that they could simplify their reserve man-
agement by voluntarily agreeing to
maintain a required clearing balance.
7
Maintaining a required clearing balance
changes the expected cost to the
depository of satisfying its statutory
reserve requirements because the
additional Federal Reserve deposits
provide an inexpensive cushion against
costly shortfalls relative to statutory
reserve requirements. Deﬁciencies relative
to the contracted clearing balance impose
little cost on the institution, while permit-
ting it to use all its Federal Reserve
deposits to satisfy its statutory
requirements. At the same time, the
Federal Reserve deposits used to satisfy
the clearing balance contract accumulate
earnings credits at about the federal funds
rate.
The Federal Reserve deposits held to
satisfy a required clearing balance contract
act as a buffer stock relative to the deposits
needed to satisfy statutory reserve require-
ments because, under Federal Reserve
accounting rules, balances in a depository’s
Federal Reserve account are applied ﬁrst to
satisfy its statutory required reserves and
only thereafter to satisfy the clearing
balance requirement. Hence, when an
institution’s Federal Reserve deposit
balance falls below its expectation, the
shortage is recorded in the Federal
Reserve’s accounting system as a deﬁciency
on a clearing balance requirement rather
than as a deﬁciency on a statutory reserve
requirement (provided the sum of vault
cash and Federal Reserve deposits exceeds
the institution’s required reserves). 
No penalties are imposed for small
deﬁciencies on voluntary clearing balance
contracts, and larger shortfalls are
penalized at only a 2 or 4 percent annual
interest rate (see Stevens, 1993). Deﬁcien-
cies relative to required reserves are
subject to signiﬁcant penalties and
“administrative counseling,” while compa-
rable deﬁciencies relative to a clearing
requirement are subject to minimal penal-
ties. An institution that sometimes has
been forced to borrow at either the
discount window or a penalty federal
funds rate to cover reserve deﬁciencies
may ﬁnd the required clearing balance
account comforting.
By 1985, about 4500 institutions had
clearing balance contracts, totaling
approximately $1.2 billion (Figure 1).
These numbers were about the same in the
third quarter of 1990, before the December
1990 reduction in reserve requirements on
nonpersonal time deposits and certain
other liabilities. Two years later, during the
third quarter of 1992, the amount of con-
tracted required clearing balances hadFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
7
nearly tripled to approximately $4.5
billion while the number of institutions
had increased to about 4700.8
In summary, proper measures of the
monetary base should include deposits
held at Federal Reserve Banks to satisfy
required clearing balance contracts, for
several reasons:
• First, the size of a contract, and hence
the amount of additional Federal
Reserve deposits that must be held to
satisfy the contract, is determined by a
depository institution’s asset and
liability management strategy, not by
any regulation. An institution may
change the size of its clearing balance
commitment when it desires,
appropriate to its business needs.9
“Required” clearing balance contracts
are voluntary commitments.
• Second, the Federal Reserve deposits
held to satisfy a clearing balance con-
tract are available to settle interbank
payments in the same way as other
Federal Reserve deposits. These
deposits are maintained in the same
Federal Reserve account that contains
deposits used to satisfy statutory
reserve requirements.
• Finally, the Federal Reserve deposits
used to satisfy required clearing
balance contracts are supplied by the
Federal Reserve, through actions such
as open market operations, in the same
way as other high-powered money.
They are not a distinct type of funds.
Including the amount of required
clearing balance contracts in the monetary
base is not without objection. Some depos-
itory institutions seem to adjust the size of
their contract inversely to changes in the
federal funds rate, seeking perhaps to gen-
erate only enough earnings credits to pay
for their use of the Federal Reserve’s priced
services. For these institutions, the
demand for Federal Reserve deposits may
be highly interest-elastic and largely unre-
lated to either liquidity management or
lending decisions. If so, argue some
analysts, required clearing balances should
be excluded from the monetary base.
Relatively simple macroeconomic
analysis shows that this argument has no
implications for deﬁnition or measurement
of the adjusted monetary base. In previous
articles, we have explored the dependence
of most money multiplier components,
such as k and e, on economic variables
such as interest rates and income
(Anderson and Rasche, 1982; Anderson,
Johannes and Rasche, 1983). Although it
seems likely that including required
clearing balances in the monetary base will
increase the interest elasticity of the excess
reserve ratio, e, this increase has no impli-
cations for the importance of the adjusted
base as a policy indicator in models where
changes in the adjusted monetary base are
transmitted to the economy solely through
changes in a monetary aggregate, M. In
these models, the role of the adjusted
monetary base as an indicator of the stance
of monetary policy is independent of the
size of the elasticity of multiplier
components such as k (the nonbank pub-
lic’s desired ratio of currency to checkable
deposits) and e (depository institutions’
desired ratio of excess reserves to
checkable deposits) with respect to
8 The actual amount of Federal
Reserve deposits used to satisfy
depositories’ clearing balance
contracts is not available. These
data are the nominal contracted
amounts.
9 However, Federal Reserve oper-
ating rules generally discourage
changes more frequently than
once a month, or approximate-
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February 1994, Increase in federal funds rate target
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April 1992, Reduction in
reserve requirements
April 1995, Nationwide spread
of OCD sweep programs begins
December 1990, Reduction in
reserve requirements
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10In this article, we make an
additional change to the Burger
and Rasche methodology. They
proposed that a single RAM
adjustment be used in creating
the adjusted monetary base.
We adopt the proposal of
Tatom (1980), who observed
that the RAM adjustment was
appropriate only for changes in
reserve-requirement ratios with-
in a given overall structure of
requirements.
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variables such income and interest rates.
For further discussion, see Anderson and
Rasche (1996b).
Comparison of U.S. and foreign
payments systems reinforces our decision
to include the aggregate amount of
required clearing balance contracts in the
monetary base. In some countries, deposi-
tory institutions’ need to settle interbank
payments in central bank deposits has
been cited as a justiﬁcation for effective,
binding statutory reserve requirements
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 1994, pp. 70-80).
In countries without statutory reserve
requirements, all central bank deposits held
by depository institutions are clearing bal-
ances; yet, such deposits play an important
role in the central bank’s monetary policy
(see Bank of Canada, 1987, 1989, 1991;
Bank for International Settlements, 1993).
ADJUSTING THE MONETARY
BASE FOR CHANGES IN
RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
The adjusted monetary base combines
in a single index three Federal Reserve
actions that affect the supply of the mone-
tary base—open market operations,
discount window lending, and unsterilized
foreign exchange market intervention—
with changes in statutory reserve
requirements that affect depository institu-
tions’ demand for the monetary base.
Hence, measuring the adjusted monetary
base requires a mechanism that can trans-
late changes in the demand for base money
due to changes in statutory reserve
requirements into equivalent changes in
the supply of base money due to open
market operations or similar actions. The
reserve adjustment magnitude, or RAM,
provides such a mechanism by measuring
the amount by which the aggregate quan-
tity of base money demanded by
depository institutions during any given
period has been affected by changes in
reserve requirements, relative to a selected
base period.
Combining the effects of changes in
statutory reserve requirements with those
from open market operations and similar
instruments depends, implicitly or explic-
itly, on a model of depository institutions’
demand for base money. Absent a fully
worked out model of bank liquidity man-
agement and reserve demand, we use
statistical tests to identify the characteris-
tics of depositories that likely have, and
have not, responded to changes in reserve
requirements since 1980. Only the former
set of institutions is included in our new
RAM adjustment. 
The original St. Louis adjusted mone-
tary base published by Andersen and
Jordan (1968) included an adjustment for
“reserves released by changes in reserve
requirements.” The adjustment,
constructed as suggested by Brunner
(1961), added to the monetary base at
each date the cumulative dollar amount by
which past changes in reserve
requirements had changed the level of
required reserves. Although each change in
reserve requirements was viewed as
absorbing or liberating a certain dollar
amount of required reserves, these
amounts depended only on the amount of
reservable deposits on the date of the
reduction: They did not vary in later
periods with changes in the levels of
reservable deposits.
In 1977, Burger and Rasche (1977)
showed that Brunner’s adjustment for the
effects of reserve-requirement ratio
changes was inadequate because it did not
consider the amount by which past
changes in reserve-requirement ratios
affected banks’ current required reserves.
They showed that a suitable adjustment
must vary with current deposit levels if it
is to remove the total effect of the change
in reserve-requirement ratios from the
monetary base multiplier (and no more).
They proposed that the adjusted monetary
base be measured as the sum of the mone-
tary (source) base and a time-varying
reserve adjustment magnitude (RAM), a
methodology that has generally been
maintained in subsequent revisions of the
St. Louis adjusted monetary base.
10
Substantial changes in the structure of
reserve requirements since 1980 suggest a
reexamination of the Burger and RascheFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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methodology. We formalize their analysis
by considering a model with two classes 
of institutions. Those in the ﬁrst class
resemble the member commercial banks
considered by Burger and Rasche:  Their
required reserves exceed their vault cash,
and they must hold deposits at Federal
Reserve Banks to satisfy the balance of
their statutory requirements. As a result,
statutory reserve requirements play an
important role in determining their demand
for base money. Institutions in the second
class ﬁnd legal reserve requirements much
less inﬂuential in their portfolio allocation
decisions:  Their level of required reserves
is less than their vault cash, and they need
not hold any deposits at Federal Reserve
Banks to satisfy statutory requirements.
The demand by these institutions for
deposits at Federal Reserve Banks depends
largely on their need to make interbank
payments in immediately available funds
on the books of the Federal Reserve Banks,
and perhaps on Federal Reserve restric-
tions regarding daylight overdrafts.
11
 
Monetary Base Multipliers before
1980
We begin with a model that reﬂects
the institutional environment before the
Monetary Control Act of 1980. Since our
purpose is to illustrate the dependence of
the RAM adjustment on the distribution of
deposits among different classes of deposi-
tory institutions, we separate member and
nonmember banks more explicitly than
have previous authors.12 We assume 
(1) a central bank that issues two
liabilities, currency, Cu, and reserve
balances (that is, deposits at the central
bank), RB, and (2) two types of depository
institutions, indexed by superscripts M
and N (corresponding to member banks,
and to non-member banks and thrifts,
respectively), that issue demand D =
DM
 
1DN and time T = TM1TN deposits. The
two types of depositories are dissimilar in
four characteristics:
• Type M institutions are subject to cen-
tral bank reserve requirements against
deposits that may be satisﬁed by
holding either vault cash or deposits at
the central bank.
• Government deposits are only at type
M institutions.
• Type N institutions hold deposits at
type M institutions but not vice versa.
• Type N institutions are not permitted
to hold deposits at the central bank.
They are similar in two other ways:
• Both types of institutions hold vault
cash to satisfy reserve requirements
and/or to convert deposits into
currency on demand.
• Both types of institutions issue
deposits that the nonbank public
regards as perfect substitutes.
We assume that transactions among
banks, the government, and the nonbank
public are settled in terms of currency, Cu,
demand deposits held by the government
at type M depositories,  , demand
deposits held by the nonbank public at
type M and N depositories,  and  ,
respectively, and demand deposits held by
type N at type M depositories,  .
(Throughout, superscripts refer to the
owner of the deposit and subscripts to the
issuer of the deposit.) Deﬁne
and  ,
and note that 
. 
The Federal Reserve imposes reserve
requirements against demand DM and time
TM deposits at rates rD and rT, respectively,
such that the required reserves of a type M
institution are RR = rDDM1rTTM.13
The monetary base multiplier in this
model is easily derived. Suppressing time
subscripts, the monetary base is by deﬁni-
tion
MB = RB1Cu




(rDDM1rTTM) are the required reserves 
of type M institutions, 







N = + - -


















11See for example Hancock and
Wilcox (1996).
12Burger (1971) provides a simi-
lar analysis without as explicit a
separation of different classes
of institutions. 
13Historically, some nonmember
banks and thrifts faced state-
imposed reserve requirements
that had to be satisﬁed with
holdings of vault cash, deposits
in other banks, U.S Treasury
bills or certain other liquid secu-
rities. See Gilbert (1978),
Gambs and Rasche (1978),
and Gilbert and Lovati (1978).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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k D
P is currency held by the nonbank
public, 
VCM and VCN are vault cash held by
type M and N institutions, respectively,
RB are the deposits held by type M





equals the amount of high-powered
money, vault cash plus reserve balances,
held by type M institutions above and
beyond their required reserves.
For clarity, it may be useful to relate
these reserve constructs in our model to
those currently published. The Federal
Reserve Board’s reserve measures differ
from those of the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis by excluding surplus vault cash
from the deﬁnition of excess reserves. For















then RBi,M2RCBi,M is referred to as
excess reserves, where RBi,M represents
the total reserve balances held by
depository institution i at the Federal
Reserve and RCBi,M is the amount of its
required clearing balance contract (if
any). Note that RCBi,M may be zero,
and RBi,M2RCBi,M may be negative. If
RBi,M2RCBi,M = 0, then excess reserves
equal zero even though surplus vault








Measures of aggregate total and excess
reserves published by the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System omit
surplus vault cash and an amount of Fed-
eral Reserve deposits equal to depository
institutions’ required clearing balance con-
tracts.
14 The old reserve measures pub-
lished by the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis through September 1996 (discussed
in the previous section of this paper)
included surplus vault cash but omitted
required clearing balance contracts.






The reserve adjustment to the mone-
tary base, RAM, maps the effects of changes
in reserve-requirement ratios into equivalent
changes in the monetary base. The effect of
this mapping is to deﬁne new adjusted-
monetary-base multipliers for the monetary
aggregates M1 and M2 that are invariant to
changes in the reserve-requirement ratios r
D
and r






At the same time, the adjustment should
not change the response of these multi-










Letting the adjusted monetary base be
deﬁned as AMB = MB + RAM, we have: 
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14See Table 1.20 in the Federal
Reserve Bulletin or the Board’s
weekly statistical release
Aggregate Reserves of
Depository Institutions and the
Monetary Base. (H.3)FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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and  are the reserve requirement
ratios on transaction and time deposits in 
a chosen base period, respectively. The
reserve adjustment magnitude,
,
maps the change in required reserves due
to any change in reserve requirement
ratios since the speciﬁed base period into
an equivalent change in the monetary
base.
Similarly, for M2 we have





which is invariant to changes in the legal
required reserve ratios rD and rT.
The above analysis may be extended to
the case where type M institutions (those
subject to central bank reserve require-
ments) issue i = (1,...,I) classes of trans-
action deposits and j = (1,...,J) classes of
time deposits, each with possibly different
reserve requirement ratios. 
At type M institutions, let 
and 
denote the ratios of the nonbank public’s
holdings of demand and time deposits in
the ith and jth reserve classiﬁcations, respec-
tively, to their total holdings of demand
deposits, DP. Then aggregate required
reserves are15
,
and the monetary base multiplier is
Note the presence of base-period re-
serve-requirement ratios for each class of
deposit,  and  , in the denominator.
The corresponding reserve adjustment
magnitude is
Finally, as a caveat and extension to
earlier remarks, note that the RAM adjust-
ment does not make all money and credit
multipliers invariant to changes in
statutory reserve-requirement ratios. Con-
sider the monetary-base multiplier for
bank credit (BC), or mBC , deﬁned by
Brunner and Meltzer (1968) as BC =
mBCMB. In our notation,
[see Brunner and Meltzer (1968), equation
A.8, p. 32]. Let the adjusted-monetary-base
multiplier for bank credit be deﬁned as




which is not invariant to change in legal
required reserve ratios rD and rT. Thus, in
models in which intermediated (bank)
credit provides a channel of monetary
policy independent of that provided by
monetary aggregates, the adjusted
monetary base deﬁned above is not an ade-
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15Recall that only type M institu-
tions are subject to statutory
reserve requirements in this
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quate indicator variable for the stance of
monetary policy.
Adjusting for Reserve Requirement
Changes with “Economically
Nonbound” Institutions
For periods prior to late 1980, deposi-
tory institutions are easily separated into
two groups based on their holdings of base
money: Member banks held vault cash,
were subject to Federal Reserve System
reserve requirements, and generally held
deposits at Federal Reserve Banks;
nonmember banks and thrifts held vault
cash and were not eligible to hold deposits
at Federal Reserve Banks.
Studies of the adjusted monetary base
prior to 1980 generally assumed that
member banks changed their holdings 
of base money about dollar-for-dollar fol-
lowing changes in their required reserves
due to changes in reserve-requirement
ratios. During that period, member banks
held few excess reserves, and most banks
likely faced reserve-requirement ratios suf-
ﬁciently high to constrain their portfolio
allocation decisions.16 The use of Federal
Reserve deposits to settle interbank
payments was little discussed. The general
assumption among economists and
banking analysts seemed to be that either
banks’ deposits at Federal Reserve Banks
were more than adequate to absorb debits
and originate payments, or that the Fed-
eral Reserve would supply adequate
intraday credit. Banks also had very
limited ability to alter their demand for
base money by inducing customers to shift
funds from transaction to nontransaction
deposits. Time deposits, with the exception
of large negotiable certiﬁcates of deposit,
were subject to effective Regulation Q
interest rate ceilings. Overall, both banks
and their customers likely were sufﬁciently
constrained that other multiplier compo-
nents (such as the ratio of time and savings
deposits to transaction deposits, or t) were
unaffected by changes in legal reserve-
requirement ratios on deposits.
Under this regime, the total amount of
base money demanded by depositories
equaled the sum of member banks’
required and excess reserves, plus the
vault cash held by other depositories.
Because member banks applied essentially
all their vault cash to satisfy reserve
requirements, and because required
clearing balances were approximately zero,
excess reserves at member banks equaled
the difference between their deposits at
Federal Reserve Banks (denoted as RB)
and the portion of their required reserves
not satisﬁed by vault cash:
ERM = RBM2(rDDM1rTTM2VCM).
(Note that RB denotes both the reserve
balances and total Federal Reserve Bank
deposits held by member banks; without
required clearing balance contracts, these
are exactly the same.) Excess reserves for
the banking system as a whole equaled the
sum of excess reserves at member banks plus
vault cash at nonmember banks, VCN. The
average aggregate excess reserve ratio was
Today’s environment is considerably
different. The Monetary Control Act
extended reserve requirements to all
depository institutions, reduced to zero
required reserves on savings and personal
time deposits, and signiﬁcantly reduced
other reserve requirements on member
banks. During December 1990 and
January 1991, reserve-requirement ratios
on nonpersonal time deposits and Euro-
dollar liabilities were reduced to zero for
all depository institutions. In April 1992,
reserve-requirement ratios on transaction
deposits were reduced to 10 percent from
12 percent.17 Depository institutions also
gained greater freedom to adjust their mix
of reservable and nonreservable deposits
during the 1980s, following the end of
Regulation Q ceilings on deposit offering
rates.
Following implementation of the
Monetary Control Act, many depository
institutions found that their vault cash,
although largely held for retail business
reasons, also satisﬁed their reserve require-
ments.18 In the Federal Reserve System,






P = + =
+
.
16In 1977, required reserve
ratios at member banks ranged
from a minimum of 7 percent
on the ﬁrst two million of net
demand deposits to 16.25 per-
cent on net demand deposits in
excess of 400 million dollars.
The required reserve ratio on
savings deposits was 3 percent
and the reserve requirements
on time deposits maturing in
less than 180 days were 3 per-
cent on the ﬁrst $5 million and
6 percent on time deposits in
excess of $5 million. (Federal
Reserve Bulletin, December,
1977, p. A9)
17In 1995, the reserve require-
ment ratio on the ﬁrst $3.8
million of net transaction
deposits was zero (the reserve
exemption amount), and only
3 percent on the next $51 mil-
lion (the low reserve tranche).
The cutoff for the low reserve
tranche is changed annually.
18Reserve requirements were
increased from zero on all non-
member depository institutions.
The full imposition of reserve
requirements on these institu-
tions was phased in over the
period between 1981 and
1987.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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their required reserves with vault cash are
known as “nonbound” institutions; other
institutions are known as “bound” institu-
tions. In this article, we refer to these
institutions as L-Nonbound and L-Bound,
respectively. Table 2 shows the percentage
distribution of L-Bound and L-Nonbound
depository institutions among depositories
reporting data to the Federal Reserve for
selected years from 1981-95. (The rows
labeled E-Bound and E-Nonbound are
explained later.) Part A of the table
includes only institutions that reported
data weekly, while Part B includes institu-
tions that reported quarterly and
annually.
19 In mid-1983, after the initial
phase-in of the Monetary Control Act,
about 40 percent of the total deposits
reported by weekly-reporting institutions
was at L-Nonbound institutions; for all
reporting institutions, shown in Part B,
about 43 percent of deposits was at L-Non-
bound institutions. By mid-1989, these
proportions had fallen to approximately 18
percent (in Part A) and 25 percent (in Part
B). The 1990-91 reduction in reserve-
requirement ratios increased the propor-
tion of total deposits at L-Nonbound
weekly reporting institutions to about 27
percent in 1991.
We regard L-Nonbound institutions as
facing no effective reserve requirement–
related constraint because they seem
unlikely to change the asset mix of their
portfolios following a change in statutory
reserve requirements. L-Nonbound institu-
tions satisfy their required reserves with
vault cash, and we assume that their hold-
ings of vault cash are determined almost
entirely by business needs, rather than by
statutory reserve requirements. As a result,
these institutions seem unlikely to change
their portfolio mix of assets in response to
a change in reserve-requirement ratios.
Vault cash held by L-Nonbound
depository institutions in excess of their
required reserves is known as “surplus
vault cash.” Surplus vault cash is “surplus”
only in the sense that some part of the
bank’s vault cash is not used to satisfy
statutory reserve requirements. No
statutory requirement determines a deposi-
tory’s vault cash; these amounts are volun-
tarily chosen by the institutions’ managers.
As such, they presumably reﬂect anticipated
business of the institution, and hence are
not surplus in the economic sense of indi-
cating a portfolio disequilibrium. Surplus
vault cash is included in both the old and
new St. Louis’ measures of the adjusted
monetary base, and in the Board of Gover-
nors’ measure of the monetary base, not
adjusted for reserve requirement changes
and not seasonally adjusted. It is excluded,
however, from the Board of Governors’
measure of the monetary base, adjusted for
changes in reserve requirements.
Historical data on surplus vault cash
are shown in Figure 2 (see page ••).
Before 1959, vault cash could not be used
to satisfy reserve requirements, so all vault
cash was surplus. Surplus vault cash
decreased sharply during 1959-60 when
Federal Reserve member banks were grad-
ually allowed to apply vault cash toward
satisfying required reserves. (The fraction
of vault cash eligible to satisfy required
reserves increased linearly at the rate of
one-twelfth per month, reaching 100 per-
cent of vault cash in December 1960.)
From 1961 to 1981, surplus vault cash
equaled the vault cash held by nonmember
banks and thrift institutions, since
member banks applied virtually all their
vault cash to satisfy reserve requirements.
Surplus vault cash grew rapidly during the
1970s as the fraction of banks that were
members of the Federal Reserve System
declined. Although the Monetary Control
Act extended reserve requirements to all
depository institutions, the requirements
were phased in during 1980-1987. During
these years, surplus vault cash generally
decreased. During the later 1980s, surplus
vault cash remained relatively constant but
exhibited substantial seasonal variation.
Although the vault cash holdings of 
L-Bound institutions are less than their
required reserves, some of these institu-
tions also might not be constrained by
legal reserve requirements. For some of
these institutions, especially smaller ones,
statutory reserve requirements might not
be an important factor in their portfolio
19For weekly-reporting institu-
tions, the data are the ﬁrst
reserve maintenance period
that begins and ends in July of
the speciﬁed year. June data
are used for quarterly and
annual reporters.NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1996
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Statistics on Legally and Economically Bound and Nonbound Depository
Institutions, Selected Years
A.  Weekly Reporting Depository Institutions (Federal Reserve FR2900 report)
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
Distribution of Reporting Depository Institutions, by reserve status (percent of reporting institutions)
L-Bound 33.7 33.6 45.4 47.5 27.4 34.4 30.2
L-Nonbound 66.3 66.4 54.6 52.5 72.6 65.6 69.8
E-Bound 33.7 33.6 45.4 47.5 5.9 6.0 5.5
E-Nonbound 66.3 66.4 54.6 52.5 94.1 94.0 94.5
Distribution of Total Deposits, by reserve status (percent of total deposits of weekly reporters)
L-Bound 60.4 70.3 79.3 81.6 72.9 78.2 75.1
L-Nonbound 39.6 29.7 20.7 18.4 27.1 21.8 24.9
E-Bound 60.4 70.3 79.3 81.6 54.8 57.7 56.3
E-Nonbound 39.6 29.7 20.7 18.4 45.2 42.3 43.7
Distribution of Net Transactions Deposits, by reserve status (percent of aggregate net transactions deposits of weekly reporters)
L-Bound 74.6 78.9 85.1 86.1 80.0 85.3 82.1
L-Nonbound 25.4 21.1 14.9 13.9 20.0 14.7 17.9
E-Bound 74.6 78.9 85.1 86.1 64.5 67.7 66.6
E-Nonbound 25.4 21.1 14.9 13.9 35.5 32.3 33.4
Distribution of Required Reserves, by reserve status (percent of aggregate required reserves of weekly reporters)
L-Bound 92.0 93.0 94.9 95.2 93.1 94.8 91.8
L-Nonbound 8.0 7.0 5.1 4.8 6.9 5.2 8.2
E-Bound 92.0 93.0 94.9 95.2 82.8 83.1 81.2
E-Nonbound 8.0 7.0 5.1 4.8 17.2 16.9 18.8
B. Statistics on the Sum of Weekly, Quarterly and Annual Reporting Depository Institutions
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
Distribution of Reporting Depository Institutions, by reserve category (percent of reporting institutions)
L-Bound 19.1 19.8 22.1 19.8 11.1 14.4 11.7
L-Nonbound 80.9 80.2 77.9 80.2 88.9 85.6 88.3
E-Bound 19.1 19.8 22.1 19.8 2.4 2.5 2.1
E-Nonbound 80.9 80.2 77.9 80.2 97.6 97.5 97.9
Distribution of Total Deposits, by reserve category (percent of reported total deposits)
L-Bound 56.9 66.8 73.9 75.5 67.1 72.1 69.1
L-Nonbound 43.1 33.2 26.1 24.5 32.9 27.9 30.9
E-Bound 56.9 66.8 73.9 75.5 50.4 53.2 51.8
E-Nonbound 43.1 33.2 26.1 24.5 49.6 46.8 48.2
Notation:  L-Bound denotes legally bound,  L-Nonbound denotes legally nonbound (applied vault cash exceeds required reserves), E-Bound denotes economically
bound (as deﬁned in this article),  E-Nonbound denotes economically nonbound.  All quarterly and annual reporting institutions are considered as both legally and
economically nonbound in the construction of this table.
Source: tabulations by the authors from unpublished Federal Reserve data.
Table 2decisions. In this article, we denote such
economically-nonbound institutions as E-
Nonbound, and other institutions—for
which reserve requirements are binding in
the traditional sense of constraining their
asset portfolio choices—as E-Bound. 
How might the portfolio reactions of
E-Bound and E-Nonbound institutions to
changes in reserve-requirement ratios
differ? The depository institutions’
ordinary business somewhat restricts their
responses. Generally, an institution must
maintain adequate stocks of vault cash to
convert customer deposits into currency
on request, and of Federal Reserve Bank
deposits to originate and absorb interbank
payments. However, both constraints are
somewhat ﬂexible. There is an intraday
market in vault cash, at least within larger
cities, suggesting that a bank might ask a
customer who is seeking a large amount of
cash to wait until later in the day, when
adequate currency can be obtained from
the Federal Reserve or from a correspon-
dent. Some banks require customers who
are planning to withdraw a signiﬁcant
amount of currency to provide at least one
business day’s notice. It also is not
uncommon for ATM machines to run out
of currency. For Federal Reserve Bank
deposits, there is a national secondary
market, the federal funds market. For
interbank payments, the Federal Reserve
may delay an interbank payment if it
exceeds applicable daylight or overnight
overdraft limitations. Because a failure to
convert a deposit into currency or to make
a requested interbank payment may
damage a customer relationship, a deposi-
tory cannot be indifferent to its mix of
vault cash and Federal Reserve Bank
deposits.
The economic distinction between E-
Bound and E-Nonbound institutions is
illustrated by the response of their excess-
reserve ratio to changes in reserve-require-
ment ratios. For E-Bound institutions,
changes in reserve-requirement ratios,
within the range where the requirement
remains a constraint on the institutions’
portfolios, will induce the institutions to
match changes in required reserves with
dollar-for-dollar changes in base money. As
a result, excess reserves (base money held
in excess of statutory requirements) will be
approximately unchanged. If all depository
institutions are E-Bound, then a change in
reserve-requirement ratios will leave the
aggregate excess reserve ratio, e, almost
unaffected. The best-known historical
example of this type of portfolio adjust-
ment is member banks’ reaction to the
1936-37 increase in reserve-requirement
ratios. Contrary to expectations of Federal
Reserve ofﬁcials, member banks’ excess
reserve ratios did not fall sharply following
the increases.
20 Surplus deposits at Federal
Reserve Banks, excess in the sense that
they were not applied to satisfy statutory
required reserves, were in fact an optimal
portfolio choice by member banks; the
deposits were not excess in any economic
sense. The reserve-requirement ratios of
1935 were effective constraints on the
banking system, with almost all member
banks E-Bound.
In contrast, consider the portfolio
response of E-Nonbound depository insti-
tutions to a change in reserve-requirement
ratios that leaves the institutions E-
Nonbound after the change. The institu-
20See Friedman and Schwartz
(1963), pp. 521-34, for a dis-
cussion of the changes in
reserve requirements and docu-
mentation that the Fed antici-
pated that the increases in
reserve-requirement ratios
would substantially reduce the
excess reserves of the banking
system. Note that only deposits
at Federal Reserve Banks were
eligible to satisfy reserve
requirements (vault cash didn’t
become eligible until 1959).
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1996
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Phase-in of applied vault cash
at member banks
November 1980, Monetary Control Act
Figure 2tions’ business needs, not legal reserve
ratios, are the primary determinant of their
base money holdings. The excess reserves
of E-Nonbound institutions will vary
approximately dollar-for-dollar but in the
opposite direction to the change in required
reserves, leaving total base money
holdings largely unaffected.
The behaviors of surplus vault cash
and required clearing balance contracts
after the 1990-91 and 1992 changes in
reserve requirement ratios suggest that a
substantial proportion of depository insti-
tutions are E-Nonbound. Surplus vault
cash, shown in Figure 2, increased sharply
in 1991 after reserve-requirement ratios
were reduced to zero from 3 percent on
nonpersonal time deposits and Euro-
dollar liabilities. This increase suggests
that at least some depository institutions
with surplus vault cash were E-Non-
bound during 1990. More dramatic
perhaps was the sharp increase in required
clearing balance contracts, shown in
Figure 1. 
Although almost all E-Bound insti-
tutions reduced their holdings of Federal
Reserve Bank deposits after the reduction
in reserve-requirement ratios, some 
found that attempts to match the reduc-
tion in their required reserves with a
dollar-for-dollar decrease in their Federal
Reserve deposits caused an unacceptable
increase in the probability that they might
experience either an overnight overdraft
or exceed their regulatory cap on day-
light overdrafts.
21 This increase also was
likely due, at least in part, to depository
institutions’ recognition that Federal
Reserve Bank deposits no longer needed
to satisfy statutory reserve requirements
could be used to satisfy required clearing
balance contracts. Note that the 1991
surge in required clearing balance
contracts occurred after several years 
of stability in the amount of such
balances.
The aggregate data on required
clearing balance contracts also are consis-
tent, at least in part, with the alternative
hypothesis that some part of required
clearing balances is held primarily to
defray the cost of Federal Reserve priced
services. Clearing balances surged during
1991 and 1992 as growth of the monetary
base accelerated and the federal funds rate
fell, and they decreased sharply during
1994 as growth of the base slowed and the
federal funds rate rose. Although some
institutions likely adjust the size of their
clearing balance contracts inversely with
respect to changes in the federal funds
rate, the changes in 1991 seem too large to
be primarily a reaction to a lower federal
funds rate.
If E-Nonbound institutions represent a
signiﬁcant share of the monetary base held
by depository institutions, it is important
to separate them from E-Bound institu-
tions when measuring RAM. To make the
analysis more precise, consider an econ-
omy with two distinct groups of deposi-
tory institutions, both subject to Federal
Reserve System reserve requirements.
Deﬁne economic excess reserves as 
ERi = RBi2(rDDi1rTTi2VCi),i = (EB,EN) ,
where RB denotes total Federal Reserve
Bank deposits held by all depository insti-
tutions (with no deduction for the amount
of required clearing balance contracts),
and let the subscripts EB and EN denote
groups of E-Bound and E-Nonbound insti-
tutions, respectively. E-Bound institutions
are assumed to change the amount of base
money they demand (relative to reservable
deposits) approximately dollar-for-dollar
following a change in statutory required
reserve ratios. For this group, changes in




institutions do not change their holdings
of base money (relative to reservable
deposits) following a change in reserve-
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21See Richards (1995) or
Hancock and Wilcox (1996).changes in equal absolute amount, but in
the opposite direction, to the reserve-
requirement ratio. 
In the previous section, we derived the
RAM adjustment proposed by Burger and
Rasche (prior to passage of the Monetary
Control Act) from a decomposition of the
monetary base into the amounts of base
money held by member banks, by other
depository institutions, and by the
nonbank public:
MB = RB1Cu




The analysis of this section suggests that a
similar decomposition between E-Bound
and E-Nonbound institutions would be
useful for the period since implementation
of the MCA. In obvious notation, the mon-
etary base may be written as
.
The appropriate RAM for inclusion in the
adjusted monetary base is then 
,
where  and  denote the statutory
reserve-requirement ratios on demand and
time deposits, respectively, during the base
period of the RAM adjustment.22 Note that
this RAM includes only deposits at E-Bound
institutions. In all essential aspects, the treat-
ment of E-Nonbound institutions in this
RAM is analogous to the treatment of non-
member banks in Burger and Rasche (1977).
The adjusted monetary base may be
written as
AMB = MB1RAM
The adjusted monetary base multiplier is
By assumption, eEB does not change when
or  changes because E-Bound
institutions match reductions in their
required reserves due to changes in statu-
tory reserve-requirement ratios about
dollar-for-dollar with reductions in their
holdings of base money. In contrast, eEN
is assumed to change when  or 
changes so as to leave the second term in
the denominator ( )
unchanged.
To measure accurately this post-Mone-
tary Control Act RAM, it is necessary to
determine the time-varying fractions 
of transaction deposits, dEB, and time
deposits, tEB, at E-Bound depository insti-
tutions. These fractions cannot be identiﬁed
in aggregate data; they must be obtained
from data on individual ﬁnancial institu-
tions. Later in this article we present a
statistical analysis of individual bank data
that allows us to develop criteria for sepa-
rating E-Bound and E-Nonbound institu-
tions. Some of the results of that analysis are
shown in Figures 3 and 4, and in Table 2.
The estimated number of E-Bound deposi-
tory institutions, shown in Figure 3, fell 
by 80 percent, to about 500 institutions,
following the 1990-91 reduction in reserve
requirements. 
The proportions of transaction and
nontransaction deposits at E-Bound insti-
tutions, shown in Figure 4, fell from peaks
in 1990 to approximately 65 and 54 per-
cent, respectively, following the 1990-91
reduction in reserve requirements. (Recall
that the reserve-requirement ratio on time
and savings deposits was reduced to zero
in December 1990.) The rows labeled E-
Nonbound and E-Bound in Table 2 show
additional data. In 1995, we estimate that
only about 2 percent of U.S. depository
institutions were E-Bound—that is, found
statutory reserve requirements to be an
important determinant of their business
decisions. Only deposits at these E-Bound
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22The new St. Louis adjusted
monetary base incorporates four
RAM adjustments, each built
using a different base period.
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17institutions are included in the new RAM
adjustment for the St. Louis adjusted mone-
tary base (see Anderson and Rasche, 1996a).
Time Deposit Ratios and Reserve
Requirement Changes 
Our discussion of RAM has focused to
this point on the direct impact of changes
in reserve-requirement ratios on the mone-
tary base multiplier, assuming that the
other ratios in the adjusted monetary base
multipliers for M1 and M2 are unaffected
by changes in the reserve requirement
ratios, or that
In the previous section, we showed how,
for E-Nonbound institutions, the excess
reserve ratio, e, might be a function of r. 
In this subsection, we explore whether 
the time deposit ratio, t, might be a func-
tion of r.
The end of Regulation Q ceilings on
deposit offering rates during the early
1980s gave depository institutions a tool,
changes in deposit offering rates, that
could in principle be used to adjust their
reserve positions by inducing customers to
shift among categories of deposits with dif-
ferent reserve-requirement ratios. In a
competitive market without legal interest
rate ceilings, it seems reasonable to expect
that changes in reserve-requirement ratios
will affect the rates offered by E-Bound
institutions on different types of deposits.
Further, it seems reasonable that economic
agents will base decisions about the
proportion of their wealth to hold in the
form of time deposits, in part, on the rates
of return offered on time deposits. If so,
following implementation of the Monetary
Control Act, competitive pressures may
have caused increases in offering rates on
savings and time deposits, relative to those
on transaction deposits. Similarly, the
December 1990–January 1991 reduction 
to zero of reserve requirements on nonper-
sonal time deposits may have increased
offering rates on large negotiable CDs rela-
tive to other instruments. Both events may
have increased the ratio of time deposits to
transaction deposits at E-Bound institu-
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Number of Institutions Included in RAM






























First maintenance period in July of each year
Figure 3
Proportions of Deposits in Economically
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Figure 4Testing for a shift in the time deposit
ratio circa 1980 is difﬁcult, due to Regula-
tion Q controls. Data from the latter period
(1990-91) suggest, however, that banks do
not alter their offering rates in response to
substantial changes in reserve requirements.
The spreads between rates on large
negotiable CDs and on Treasury bills and
commercial paper are shown in Figure 5.
Although there is considerable variability
from week to week, there is no discernible
trend. The spread of CD rates over three-
and six-month Treasury bill rates ﬂuc-
tuates around 50 basis points; the spread
of CD rates over commercial paper rates
ﬂuctuates around zero. Neither has any
discernible spikes or shifts at the beginning
of 1991 when the reserve-requirement
ratio was reduced to zero on nonpersonal
time deposits. Hence, we do not include in
RAM any adjustment for potential indirect
effects of reserve-requirement ratio changes
on the multiplier via changes in the time-





In this section, the reactions of
commercial banks to the December
1990–January 1991 and April 1992 reduc-
tions in reserve requirement ratios are
23The multiplier discussed here is
for transaction money, M1.
Multipliers for the broader mea-
sures of money such as zero-
maturity money (MzM), M2,
and M3 include additional
terms in their numerators
which, in a more detailed anal-
ysis, would be shown as com-
ponents of the time deposit
ratio, t.  For examples, see
Rasche and Johannes (1985).
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Rate Spreads on 3-Month Instruments
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Rate Spreads on 6-Month Instruments
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75 79 83 77 81 85 87 89 91 93 95 97examined in an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) framework.24 The analysis seeks
to quantify the different reactions of L-
Bound and L-Nonbound banks, of various
sizes, to changes in statutory reserve-
requirement ratios. The goal of the
analysis is to develop criteria that
distinguish E-Bound from E-Nonbound
institutions, consistent with the construc-
tion of RAM outlined above. Our data
sample consists of commercial banks that
reported weekly deposit and reserve levels
to the Federal Reserve from mid-1990
through the end of 1992.
To this point in this article, the terms
bound (L-Bound) and nonbound (L-
Nonbound) have described the reserve
position of an individual bank during a
single reserve maintenance period. (Recall
that a bank is said to be L-Nonbound if it
fully satisﬁes its required reserves with
vault cash.) In this section, we use these
terms more broadly. For tractability in sta-
tistical analysis, we classify individual
banks as being either of type L-Bound or
type L-Nonbound according to a speciﬁed
criterion applied to the bank during a
number of reserve maintenance periods.
This classiﬁcation system would be trivial if
all institutions, during all reserve main-
tenance periods, were either L-Bound or 
L-Nonbound and did not change status. 
In fact, small and medium size institutions
often change categories, being L-Nonbound
in periods when retail cash demands are
heavy and L-Bound in others; larger banks
tend to remain consistently in one category.
In our analysis, we examined three
alternative criteria for classifying a bank as
type L-Bound:  (1) the bank was L-Bound
during maintenance periods in the second
half of 1992 (1992 H2), regardless of its
status in other years; (2) the bank was 
L-Bound during maintenance periods in
1990 H2, regardless of its status in other
years; and, (3) the bank was L-Bound
during all maintenance periods in 1990
H2, 1991 H2 and 1992 H2. We ﬁnd that
statistical inferences regarding the reaction
of banks to changes in statutory reserve
requirements are robust to reasonable
alternative criteria. Parts A and B of Tables
3, 4, 5, and 6 show comparative results
based on cases (1) and (3), respectively. 
Our size groupings are broadly consis-
tent with categories used in other banking
studies. Banks classiﬁed as L-Bound are
subsequently separated into four size
classes—small, medium, regional and large
—based on net transaction deposits, while
L-Nonbound banks are separated into only
two: small and medium. There are too few
larger L-Nonbound banks for analysis. The
Monetary Control Act of 1980 established
a tiered system of reserve requirements
wherein the ﬁrst $25 million of net trans-
action deposits, the “low reserve tranche,”
was subject to a 3 percent requirement,
while larger amounts were subject to a 12
percent requirement. Initially set at $25
million, the low reserve tranche is indexed
annually to the change in the aggregate
amount of net transaction deposits. We
classify banks in our sample data as small
if their holdings of net transaction deposits
did not exceed the low reserve tranche
during any reserve maintenance period in
the second half of 1990 (the low reserve
tranche was $41.1 million in 1990).25 We
classify banks as medium-sized if their
average level of net transaction deposits
during the second half of 1990 was greater
than the low reserve tranche but less than
$135 million, as regional-sized if their net
transaction deposits averaged more than
$135 million but less than $500 million,
and as large if their net transaction
deposits averaged more than $500 million.
Statistical inferences regarding banks’
reactions to reserve-requirement changes
are robust to reasonable alternative size-
classiﬁcation schemes. Use of the low
reserve tranche for delineating small banks
provides an important control in our anal-
ysis, because the April 1992 change in
reserve-requirement ratios affected only
banks with transaction deposits above the
tranche. Results for the medium and
regional groups are not sensitive to the
precise cut-off selected to separate the
groups because there are relatively few
banks with net transaction deposits
between about $100 to $150 million. The
$500 million cut-off places about 150
24Because of the unsettled state
of the thrift industry during this
period, we exclude thrifts from
the analysis. 
25The Garn-St. Germain Act of
1982 created the reserve
exemption amount, which is
subject to a zero reserve
requirement. Originally $2.1
million of deposits, it also is
indexed. See Anderson and
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group of large weekly reporting banks on
the list published by the Federal Reserve.26
The estimated models shown below also
are not sensitive to inclusion or exclusion
of banks that acquired other institutions.
Summarizing our results, we ﬁnd that:
• L-Nonbound banks did not change their
holdings of base money (vault cash plus
Federal Reserve Bank deposits), relative
to transaction deposits, when reserve
requirements changed in 1990-91 or
1992.
These banks chose to hold enough vault
cash to satisfy their reserve requirements.
If vault cash is held primarily to convert
deposits into currency on request, then
their holdings of vault cash are likely to be
insensitive to changes in statutory reserve
requirements. The quantity of Federal
Reserve Bank deposits held by these banks,
if any, is unlikely to be affected by changes
in statutory reserve requirements because
the deposits are not being held to satisfy
reserve requirements.
• Small and medium-sized L-Bound banks
changed their holdings of base money
somewhat in response to the 1990-91
reduction of the reserve-requirement
ratio on time and savings deposits to
zero from 3 percent, but they did not
respond to the 1992 reduction of the
reserve requirement ratio on net transac-
tion deposits to 10 percent from 12
percent.
Small L-Bound institutions primarily differ
from small L-Nonbound institutions by
choosing to hold less vault cash; the two
groups of banks have similar mixtures of
deposits. In the absence of a fully worked
out model of bank reserve management, it
is difﬁcult to identify factors that might
account for the differing responses of small
L-Nonbound and small L-Bound to the
1990-91 changes in reserve-requirement
ratios. In contrast, the 1992 reduction in
the reserve-requirement ratio on net trans-
action deposits affected (algebraically)
only larger institutions with net
transaction deposits above approximately
$42 million. The reduction had no effect
on banks subject to only a 3 percent
marginal reserve requirement, and only a
weak effect on medium-sized banks that
faced a 12 percent requirement on only a
part of their transaction deposits.
• Larger L-Bound banks responded
strongly to the 1990-91 reduction and
somewhat less strongly to the 1992
reduction.
These banks chose to satisfy their required
reserves by holding relatively large
amounts of Federal Reserve Bank deposits.
In general, these amounts are more than
what is necessary for the banks’ payments-
related activities, such as check clearing
and wire transfer. If statutory reserve
requirements are binding for any group of
banks, it must be for these.
Our models seek to estimate the
response of banks’ base money holdings to
changes in reserve requirements.
Measuring the amount of base money held
by some nonmember institutions is prob-
lematic, however. While all banks in our
data report their daily holdings of vault
cash to the Federal Reserve, some
nonmember banks do not hold Federal
Reserve deposits in their own name;
rather, they hold them indirectly via a
passthrough contract with a correspondent
bank.27 In addition, some nonmember
banks hold Federal Reserve deposits both
indirectly (through a correspondent) and
directly (in their own account). We
increased the Federal Reserve deposits
reported by banks with passthrough
reserve arrangements by an amount equal
to the difference between the bank’s
required reserves and its applied vault
cash. At the same time, we reduced each
correspondent bank’s reported Federal
Reserve deposits by the amount of its
respondent banks’ required reserves
charged against the correspondent’s
Federal Reserve account. Given the data
reported by banks to the Federal Reserve,
this is the only feasible method for
measuring the amount of Federal Reserve
deposits held (indirectly) by banks with
passthrough reserve contracts.
Summary statistics for our sample of
banks are shown in Table 3. The sample
consists of commercial banks that reported
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26See Table 1.27 in the Federal
Reserve Bulletin.
27Nonmember depository institu-
tions may contract with the
Federal Reserve to satisfy their
required reserves (beyond vault
cash) by having the amount of
the requirement charged
against the Federal Reserve
deposit account of an eligible
correspondent institution (a so-
called “passthrough” reserve
contract). Nonmember institu-
tions that satisfy required
reserves via passthrough con-
tract may open an additional
Federal Reserve account in their
own name. Federal Reserve
deposits in this second account
may be used to satisfy a
required clearing balance con-
tract but may not be used to
satisfy required reserves. (Of
course, the funds could be
loaned via the federal funds
market to the correspondent.)data weekly to the Federal Reserve from
mid-1990 through the end of 1992.28
Banks without data for all included reserve
maintenance periods are omitted, as are
banks involved in mergers or acquisi-
tions.29 Part A and Part B of the table show
banks classiﬁed as L-Bound and L-Non-
bound via two alternative schemes. In Part
A, banks are classiﬁed as L-Bound if they
were L-Bound in 1992 H2, after both the
1990-91 and 1992 reductions in reserve
requirements; banks not classiﬁed as L-
Bound are classiﬁed as L-Nonbound, even
if they were bound during some reserve
maintenance periods in 1990 and 1991. In
Part B, banks are classiﬁed as L-Bound if
and only if they were L-Bound in every
reserve maintenance period during 1990
H2, 1991 H2 and 1992 H2; otherwise, they
are classiﬁed as L-Nonbound. Application
of the latter criteria reduces the number of
L-Bound banks from 1822 in part A to 710
in part B, primarily by pushing banks that
are close to being L-Nonbound (or in
other words, they hold enough vault cash
to fully satisfy their required reserves in
some maintenance periods) from the L-
Bound group in part A into the L-Non-
bound group in part B.
30
Part A of Table 3 shows that the 1990-
91 reduction in reserve requirements on
nonpersonal time and savings deposits
reduced required reserves at small, medium,
regional and large banks by about 44 
percent, 19 percent, 17 percent and 18 
percent, respectively, after allowing for
increases in their net transactions deposits.
On average, these banks satisﬁed about
one-half of their required reserves with
vault cash (column 4).31 Contracted
clearing balances increased sharply from
1990 to 1992, approximately doubling for
the smallest banks and increasing by almost
an order of magnitude for large banks.
A Traditional Fixed Effects ANOVA
Model
In Table 4 (see page ••), we present
traditional ANOVA ﬁxed-effects regression
estimates for the effects of changes in
reserve requirements in 1990-91 and 1992
on the ratio
during the last 13 reserve maintenance
periods in 1990, 1991 and 1992, a total of




yijt = the ratio of base money (vault
cash plus deposits at Federal Reserve
Banks) to net transaction deposits held by
bank i in maintenance period j in year t, 
(i = 1,..., N), (j = 1,...,13), (t = 90,...,92).
= 1 for bank i, and 0 otherwise,
= 1 in year t, and 0 otherwise,
= 1 in maintenance period j, and 
0 otherwise,
= 1 if bank i had a clearing
balance contract in maintenance period j
of year t, and ei
 
jt is an assumed i.i.d. distur-
bance.
The dummy variables  index the
relative position of reserve maintenance
period j within the year, with the ﬁrst
period in July of each year numbered “1”
and the last period of the year numbered
“13”. As such, they absorb seasonal ﬂuctu-
ations that may differ in strength across
banks. We interpret the  as repre-
senting the effects of changes in reserve
requirements between 1990, 1991, and
1992, although as dummy variables they
may also pick up other year-speciﬁc
effects. Estimates presented in Parts A and
B of Table 4 correspond to the statistics
shown in Parts A and B of Table 3. Because
the estimates in Parts A and B are similar,
we discuss only the estimates shown in
Part A. Standard errors reported in the
table are Huber-White robust estimates of
the regression covariance matrix.
For all groups of banks, the null
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28Our sample may underrepre-
sent small depository institu-
tions that are not required to
report data weekly to the
Federal Reserve. We assume
that virtually all of these institu-
tions would be classiﬁed as eco-
nomically nonbound and
excluded from the calculation
of RAM. For a discussion of
Federal Reserve data reporting
requirements, see Anderson
and Kavajecz (1994).
29Banks that acquire other depos-
itory institutions are permitted
under the Federal Reserve’s
Regulation D to phase out, dur-
ing the following eight quar-
ters, the beneﬁt of the acquired
institution’s low reserve
tranche. All banks involved in
such acquisitions are excluded
from our statistical analysis.
Such banks are included in the
calculation of RAM, where we
allow for this effect by adjust-
ing the size of the tranche loss
adjustment to reﬂect the size of
the tranche in the base period,
January 7, 1991; see
Anderson and Rasche (1996a).
30The overall sample size also is
smaller in Part B because 13
regional and large L-Bound
banks in Part A are reclassiﬁed
as L-Nonbound in Part B, and
dropped from the analysis.
31In December 1995, for exam-
ple, required reserves of all
depositories were $56.6 bil-
lion, of which $37.5 billion
was satisﬁed with vault cash.
See for example Aggregate
Reserves of Depository
Institutions and the Monetary
Base, Board of Governors’
weekly statistical release (H.3),
April 25, 1996, Table 2.
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1990
Small 1.16 0.62 0.11 0.68 24.3 1.37 1139
Medium 2.67 2.04 0.14 1.37 33.0 2.89 512
Regional 3.41 2.81 0.12 1.37 27.4 3.57 122
Large 8.68 7.12 0.10 3.64 61.1 8.86 49
1991
Small 0.72 0.72 0.17 0.61 26.9 1.09 1139
Medium 2.34 2.34 0.20 1.38 35.7 2.64 512
Regional 3.07 3.07 0.16 1.40 29.6 3.28 122
Large 7.41 7.41 0.36 3.57 63.6 7.83 49
1992
Small 0.94 0.94 0.21 0.70 31.8 1.30 1139
Medium 2.56 2.56 0.26 1.47 41.3 2.89 512
Regional 3.06 3.06 0.35 1.43 34.4 3.46 122
Large 7.08 7.08 0.89 3.55 72.4 8.01 49
L-Nonbound
1990
Small 1.45 0.85 0.21 1.33 35.78 2.33 2209
Medium 0.14 0.10 0.02 0.13 2.27 0.19 45
1991
Small 0.93 0.93 0.25 0.93 38.37 2.33 2209
Medium 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.10 2.29 0.18 45
1992
Small 1.08 1.08 0.30 1.08 43.35 2.48 2209
Medium 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.11 2.46 0.20 45
1 Classiﬁcations are based on banks’ legal reserve status in 1992 H2 and on their size in 1990 H2.  Banks are classiﬁed as L-Bound if they were legally bound in one
or more reserve maintenance periods during 1992 H2; if not, they are classiﬁed as L-Nonbound.  Banks are classiﬁed as small if their net transaction deposits did
not exceed the low reserve tranche ($40.4 million) in any reserve maintenance period during 1990 H2, and are classiﬁed as medium or regional if their average
level of net transaction deposits during 1990 H2 did not exceed $125 million or $500 million, respectively. Banks with net transaction deposits averaging more than
$500 million during 1990 H2 are classiﬁed as large. 
Table 3
Summary Statistics for Commercial Banks Used in ANOVA
(by reserve status and size, billions of dollars except number of institutions)
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Table 3, continued
Summary Statistics for Commercial Banks Used in ANOVA
(by reserve status and size, billions of dollars except number of institutions)

































Small 0.33 0.14 0.02 0.09 5.5 0.36 236
Medium 1.95 1.52 0.09 0.82 22.5 2.06 316
Regional 3.15 2.61 0.12 1.17 25.3 3.30 114
Large 8.10 6.61 0.09 3.28 56.7 8.26 44
1991
Small 0.18 0.18 0.03 0.09 6.2 0.25 236
Medium 1.73 1.73 0.11 0.85 24.4 1.87 316
Regional 2.86 2.86 0.15 1.22 27.5 3.04 114
Large 6.87 6.87 0.34 3.24 58.9 7.27 44
1992
Small 0.24 0.24 0.04 0.10 7.5 0.32 236
Medium 1.86 1.86 0.15 0.89 28.3 2.05 316
Regional 2.84 2.84 0.34 1.25 31.9 3.21 114
Large 6.64 6.64 0.86 3.21 67.9 7.53 44
L-Nonbound
1990
Small 2.28 1.32 0.30 1.92 54.6 3.34 3112
Medium 0.86 0.63 0.75 0.67 12.8 1.01 241
1991
Small 1.47 1.47 0.38 1.44 59.0 3.18 3112
Medium 0.72 0.72 0.11 0.63 13.6 0.96 241
1992
Small 1.77 1.77 0.47 1.67 67.7 3.46 3112
Medium 0.81 0.81 0.13 0.69 15.4 1.04 241
2 Banks are classiﬁed as L-Bound if they were legally bound in all reserve maintenance periods in 1990 H2, 1991 H2 and 1992 H2; if not, they are classiﬁed as L-
Nonbound.  Banks are classiﬁed as small if their net transaction deposits did not exceed the low reserve tranche ($40.4 million) in any reserve maintenance period
during 1990 H2, and are classiﬁed as medium or regional if their average level of net transaction deposits during 1990 H2 did not exceed $125 million or $500
million, respectively. Banks with net transaction deposits averaging more than $500 million during 1990 H2 are classiﬁed as large.   NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1996
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Table 4
ANOVA Model Estimates for Weekly-Reporting Banks
L-Bound Banks L-Nonbound Banks
Statistic Small  Medium Regional Large Small Medium
A.  Classiﬁed on Legal Reserve Status in 1992 and on Size in 19901
F Statistics 
(numerator degrees of freedom)
for bank ﬁxed effects 25.9 (1138) 101.3 (511) 72.4 (121) 69.0 (48) 119.7 (2208) 144.7 (44)
p-value (Pr > F) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
for year ﬁxed effect 430.2 (2) 3917.2 (2) 346.4 (2) 1152.5 (2) 2781.9 (2) 10.4 (2)
p-value (Pr > F) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Coefﬁcient Estimates (t-statistic)
Year effects
1990 versus 1992 0.021 (25.9) 0.017 (84.9) 0.032 (26.5) 0.036 (47.9) 0.009 (75.1) 0.003 (4.0)
p-value (Pr > | t |) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
1991 versus 1992 0.001 (0.8) 0.003 (17.5) 0.013 (10.5) 0.013 (17.4) 0.003 (30.7) 0.0 (0.0)
p-value (Pr > | t |) 0.4582 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.9978
Required Clearing Balance 0.004 (2.0) 0.006 (9.4) 0.022 (6.8) 0.015 (11.3) 0.009 (26.9) 0.001 (0.4)
p-value (Pr > | t |) 0.0465 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.6756
Summary Statistics
Model degrees of freedom 1153 526 136 63 2223 59
Error degrees of freedom 43267 19441 4621 1847 83927 1695
R-Squared 0.41 0.75 0.67 0.75 0.76 0.79
B.  Classiﬁed on Legal Reserve Status in 1990, 1991 and 1992, and on Size in 1990
2
F Statistics 
(numerator degrees of freedom)
for bank ﬁxed effects 47.4 (235) 85.6 (315) 73.0 (113) 75.5 (43) 32.2 (3111) 131.1 (240)
p-value (Pr > F) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
for year ﬁxed effect 426.7 (2) 2786.0 (2) 305.9 (2) 1040.7 (2) 825.9 (2) 965.8 (2)
p-value (Pr > F) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Coefﬁcient Estimates (t-statistic)
Year effects
1990 versus 1992 0.029 (24.3) 0.019 (70.6) 0.032 (24.6) 0.037 (44.8) 0.012 (39.0) 0.011 (41.6)
p-value (Pr > | t |) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
1991 versus 1992
 
20.002 (1.9) 0.004 (14.4) 0.013 (10.0) 0.012 (15.5) 0.003 (9.7) 0.002 (8.4)
p-value (Pr > | t |) 0.0612 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Required Clearing Balance 20.004 (1.1) 0.006 (6.9) 0.030 (7.4) 0.015 (11.3) 0.007 (8.8) 0.004 (4.7)
p-value (Pr > | t |) 0.2631 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Summary Statistics
Model degrees of freedom 250 330 128 58 3126 255
Error degrees of freedom 8953 11993 4317 1657 118241 9143
R-Squared 0.57 0.73 0.67 0.76 0.46 0.79
1 Banks are classiﬁed as L-Bound if they were legally bound in one or more reserve maintenance periods during 1992 H2; if not, they are classiﬁed as L-Nonbound.
Banks are classiﬁed as small if their net transaction deposits did not exceed the low reserve tranche ($40.4 million) in any reserve maintenance period during
1990 H2, and are classiﬁed as medium or regional if their average level of net transaction deposits during 1990 H2 did not exceed $125 million or $500 million,
respectively. Banks with net transaction deposits averaging more than $500 million during 1990 H2 are classiﬁed as large.   
2 Banks are classiﬁed as L-Bound if they were legally bound in all 39 reserve maintenance periods in 1990 H2, 1991 H2 and 1992 H2; if not, they are classiﬁed as
L-Nonbound. Size criteria are the same as in the previous footnote. the behavior of yijt is rejected. Consider,
then, the regression results for each group
of banks:
 
Small L-Bound banks. The model esti-
mates suggest a strong response by small
L-Bound banks to the 1990-91 reduction
in reserve requirements. The reasonable-
ness of the estimated ANOVA regression
coefﬁcients can be judged by comparing
them to estimates calculated from the
summary statistics shown in Table 3,
under the null hypothesis that the banks
are E-Bound—that is, that the banks’
reductions in their holdings of base money
will match, dollar-for-dollar, the decrease
in their required reserves. Approximately
half of the required reserves of these banks
in 1990 was due to net transaction
deposits ($620 million), and about half
was due to nontransaction deposits. Each
category of deposits was subject to a 3 per-
cent marginal requirement. Ignoring the
zero reserve requirement on the reserve
exemption amount, the reduction to zero
of the reserve-requirement ratio on
nonpersonal time and savings deposits
might reduce the banks’ average ratio of
base money to net transaction deposits by
about one-half of its 1990 value of 0.056,
or 0.028. The estimated ANOVA effect
equals the estimated coefﬁcient on the
1990 year dummy variable less the coefﬁ-
cient on the 1991 year dummy variable, or
(ˆ l902 ˆ l91) = 0.02120.001 = 0.02.
Both ˆ l90 and ˆ l91 are estimated relative to
1992 because  is omitted from the
regression. The size of ANOVA effect is
close to, but slightly smaller than, the effect
calculated from the summary statistics.
The regression coefﬁcient for 1991,
ˆ l91, measures small L-Bound banks’
reaction to the April 1992 reduction in the
marginal reserve requirement on net trans-
action deposits to10 percent from 12
percent. Because these banks’ net transac-
tion deposits were below the low reserve
tranche, their required reserves were unaf-
fected by the change. The estimated
ANOVA effect, 0.0006, is about zero, as
expected.
Medium L-Bound Banks. The results for
medium-sized L-Bound banks are similar
to those for small L-Bound banks. As
above, we can judge the reasonableness of
the estimated ANOVA effect by calculating
a preliminary estimate from the summary
statistics in Table 3, under the null
hypothesis that the banks are E-Bound
both before and after the change in the
legal requirements. About three-fourths of
the required reserves of these banks were
due to net transaction deposits in 1990,
and their total required reserves averaged
about 8.1 percent of their net transaction
deposits. Thus, reducing to zero the
reserve requirement on nonpersonal time
and savings deposits seems likely to reduce
by about one-fourth their overall ratio of
required reserves and base money holdings
relative to net transaction deposits, a
decrease of about 0.02.
The estimated ANOVA effect of the
1990 reduction equals the coefﬁcient on
the 1990 year dummy less the coefﬁcient
on the 1991 year dummy variable, or
(ˆ l902 ˆ l91) = 0.016720.0034 = 0.013.
The effect is economically signiﬁcant,
although smaller in size than our prelimi-
nary estimate which assumed that the
reduction in base money holdings would
match, dollar-for-dollar, the decrease in
required reserves.
The estimated effect of the 1992
reduction is only 0.0034. While statis-
tically signiﬁcant with such a large sample,
it is less than one-sixth of the 0.02 change
in the marginal statutory reserve require-
ment ratio. This estimate suggests that
banks in this size range reduced their
holdings of Federal Reserve deposits little,
if at all, following the decrease in the
reserve-requirement ratio. There is some
evidence of a smaller response by banks
that had required clearing balance
contracts. This difference seems consistent
with our conjecture that required clearing
balances are, for some banks at least, a
low-cost type of excess reserves. Further,
banks with required clearing balance con-
tracts likely are purchasing payments-
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deposits to avoid overdrafts.
Overall, for small and medium L-
Bound banks, the estimated responses to
the 1990-91 reduction are economically
signiﬁcant, while responses to the 1992
reduction are not. The insigniﬁcance of 
the latter coefﬁcient for small banks is
expected, since their marginal reserve ratio
remained unchanged at 3 percent. While the
1992 year effect for the medium L-Bound
banks is statistically signiﬁcantly greater
than zero, its small size makes it difﬁcult to
attribute the effect to changes in the mar-
ginal reserve requirement ratio. In part, the
estimated effect may reﬂect banks’ reaction
to the lower federal funds rate that prevailed
during 1992, relative to 1991. Below, we
compare these responses to those of similar
L-Nonbound banks.
As a result of this analysis, small and
medium-size L-Bound depository institu-
tions are assumed to have been E-Bound
prior to January 1991 and are included in
RAM through December 1990, but are
assumed to have become E-Nonbound in
January 1991 and are thereafter excluded
from RAM. With the exclusion of these
depository institutions, only about 5-1/2
percent of weekly reporting institutions, and
2 percent of all institutions (see Table 2), are
included in the revised RAM adjustment for
the St. Louis adjusted monetary base.
Regional and Large L-Bound Banks. On
balance, regional and large L-Bound banks
are estimated to have responded
signiﬁcantly to both the 1990-91 and 1992
reductions; in other words, they were E-
Bound. Preliminary estimates of the
reductions’ effects may be calculated, as
above, from Table 3. Required reserves
held against net transaction deposits were
about 83 percent of these banks’ total
required reserves in 1990, and their ratios
of total required reserves to net transaction
deposits were about 12.2 and 13.9 percent,
respectively. If the 1990-91 reductions in
required reserves were reﬂected fully in
reduced holdings of base money, we would
project an effect of more than 0.02. The esti-
mated ANOVA effect for regional banks is
(ˆ l902 ˆ l91) = 0.032120.0128 = 0.0193,
and for large banks is
(ˆ l902 ˆ l91) = 0.036420.0121 = 0.026.
Both are almost precisely what would
occur if these banks matched the
reduction in their required reserves with
dollar-for-dollar reductions in their
holdings of base money.
In contrast, these banks seem to have
reduced their holdings of base money less
than proportionately, following the April
1992 reduction in reserve requirements.
The estimated coefﬁcients, ˆ l92, for regional
and large banks—0.0128 and 0.0128,
respectively—are signiﬁcantly greater than
zero statistically and less than the 0.02
reduction in the marginal statutory
requirement. Again, banks with required
clearing balance contracts are estimated to
have reduced their holdings of base money
less than other banks. The lower federal
funds rate during 1992 likely attenuated
the reduction in Federal Reserve deposits
that otherwise would have followed the
reserve-requirement reduction. In
addition, the smaller estimated coefﬁcient
(relative to the statutory change of 0.02)
likely reﬂects some large banks becoming
E-Nonbound after the 1990-91 and 1992
reductions.32
Small and Medium-Size L-Nonbound
Banks. Estimates for L-Nonbound banks
suggest economically insigniﬁcant
responses to changes in reserve
requirements since 1990. Table 3’s
summary statistics show that required
reserves held against nontransaction
deposits were about 40 percent and 30 per-
cent, respectively, of the total required
reserves held by these banks in 1990. The
average aggregate ratios of required
reserves to net transaction deposits at
these banks were 4.1 percent and 6.2 per-
cent, respectively, suggesting that these
banks’ ratios of base money to net transac-
tion deposits might decrease by as much as
1.8 percent. The estimated ANOVA effects
of the reduction—0.005 for small banks
and 0.003 for medium bank—are fairly
similar and less than one-third of the pre-
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32See Feinman (1993) and
Hilton, Cohen and Koonmen
(1993).liminary estimate based on Table 3, under
the assumption that the banks are E-
Bound. Considering the generally lower
federal funds rate that prevailed during
this period, we have difﬁculty attributing
the change in these banks’ base money
holdings, relative to net transaction
deposits, to changes in legal reserve 
ratios.
Like medium-size L-Bound banks,
medium-size L-Nonbound banks did not
respond to the 1992 reduction in the
reserve-requirement ratio on net
transaction deposits. The estimated
ANOVA effect, 0.0035, is not economically
different from zero. 
An ANOVA Model with
Idiosyncratic Bank-Year Interactions
The ANOVA model shown above
includes a single ﬁxed effect for each bank,
ai, and assumes that the response of all
banks to the changes in statutory reserve
requirements is the same, measured by 
ˆ l90 and ˆ l91. Because it seems unlikely that
all banks responded in the same way, we
estimated a second ANOVA model that
permits idiosyncratic responses by each
bank to the year effects: 
,
where yijt is the same as above. This model
becomes the same as the previous ANOVA
if the bank-year effects are constrained to
be equal for all banks during each year, or
in other words,
In the ANOVA, the effect of the 1990-91
reduction in reserve requirements is 
measured by
ˆ bi,902 ˆ bi,91 = ( ˆ bi,902 ˆ bi,92)2( ˆ bi,912 ˆ bi,92),
and the effect of the 1992 reduction by
ˆ bi,912 ˆ bi,92. 
Distributions (histograms) of these
individual bank-year interaction effects are
shown in Figures 6-8. Summary statistics
and hypothesis tests for this model are
shown in Table 5.
33 Although Parts A and
B of Table 5 show estimates under the
same alternative L-Bound classiﬁcation cri-
teria used in Tables 3 and 4, we limit our
discussion to Part A. Figures 6-8 are based
on the regressions summarized in Part A of
Table 5.
The null hypothesis that there was no
change in the behavior of yijt across 1990,
1991, and 1992 is easily rejected by the F-
statistics reported in Table 5. The
estimated responses of individual small,
medium, regional and large L-Bound
banks to the 1990-91 reduction in reserve-
requirement ratios are shown, respectively,
in panels A and C of Figures 6 and 7
(pages •• and ••). The number of
estimated coefﬁcients plotted in each panel
is shown in the panel title. On balance, L-
Bound banks responded by signiﬁcantly
reducing their holdings of base money:
Most of the shaded area in each
distribution is well to the right of zero
(marked by a vertical line). Substantial
variation in the responses of individual
banks is evident in the ﬁgures, in part
because different banks held different pro-
portions of transaction and nontransaction
deposits (recall that the dependent variable
is the ratio of the bank’s base money hold-
ings to its transaction deposits).
In contrast, the estimated response by
L-Bound banks to the April 1992
reduction in reserve-requirement ratios,
shown in panels B and D of Figures 6 and
7, is more varied. As expected, the
distribution for small L-Bound banks
(panel B of Figure 6) is tightly centered
about zero. Medium-size L-Bound banks
(panel D of Figure 6) also responded
weakly to the change, most commonly
reducing their ratios of base money to
transaction deposits by about half of what
would be implied if they had matched the
decrease in their required reserves dollar-
for-dollar.
34 For regional-size banks (panel
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33The ANOVA models are estimat-
ed with the GLM and REG pro-
cedure in SAS, version 6.11,
on an HP Unix workstation. 
34Medium-size L-Bound banks
averaged about $80 million in
net transaction deposits (see
Table 3), the ﬁrst $3.6 million
subject to a zero reserve
requirement ratio, the next
$38.6 million to a 3 percent
ratio and, before the April
1992 reduction, the balance to
a 12 percent ratio. Their ratio
of base money to net transac-
tion deposits would have
decreased by about 1 percent-
age point if the banks had
matched the reduction in their
required reserves with a dollar-
for-dollar reduction in their hold-
ings of base money.
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percentage points, close to what would be
projected from their average net
transaction deposits of about $280 million
(see Table 3). Large L-Bound banks (panel
D of Figure 7) most commonly reduced
their base money holdings by about the
full 2 percentage points.
The ANOVA effects for L-Nonbound
banks are shown in Figure 8 (see page ••).
Because these banks satisﬁed their
statutory reserve requirement with vault
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Table 5
ANOVA Model Estimates for Weekly-Reporting Banks, with Bank-Year
Interaction Effects
L-Bound Banks L-Nonbound Banks
Statistic Small  Medium Regional Large Small Medium
A.  Classiﬁed on Legal Reserve Status in 1992 and on Size in 19901
F Statistics 
(numerator degrees of freedom)
for bank ﬁxed effects 42.9 (1138) 269.4 (511) 126.9 (121) 194.7 (48) 269.0 (2208) 298.4 (44)
p-value (Pr > F) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
for bank-year ﬁxed effect 14.0 (2278) 52.7 (1024) 20.3 (244) 100.9 (98) 27.6 (4418) 21.3 (90)
p-value (Pr > F) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Coefﬁcient Estimates (t-statistic)
Required Clearing Balance 0.005 (1.3) 0.010 (12.0) 0.022 (4.2) 0.018 (9.2) 0.006 (10.9) 0.014 (4.1)
p-value (Pr > | t |) 0.20 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Summary Statistics
Model degrees of freedom 3429 1548 378 159 6639 147
Error degrees of freedom 40991 18419 4379 1751 79511 1607
R-Squared 0.66 0.91 0.82 0.92 0.90 0.90
B.  Classiﬁed on Legal Reserve Status in 1990, 1991 and 1992, and on Size in 1990
2
F Statistics 
(numerator degrees of freedom)
for bank-year ﬁxed effects 76.8 (235) 236.9 (315) 127.7 (113) 252.0 (43) 54.6 (3111) 310.1 (240)
p-value (Pr > F) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
for year ﬁxed effect 15.8 (472) 58.8 (632) 20.0 (228) 122.9 (88) 14.7 (6224) 36.2 (482)
p-value (Pr > F) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Coefﬁcient Estimates (t-statistic)
Required Clearing Balance 0.007 (1.09) 0.008 (8.11) 0.020 (3.1) 0.0195 (10.4) 0.006 (3.6) 0.014 (10.6)
p-value (Pr > | t |) 0.27 0.0001 0.0018 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001
Summary Statistics
Model degrees of freedom 720 960 354 144 9348 735
Error degrees of freedom 8483 11363 4091 1571 112019 8663
R-Squared 0.75 0.91 0.82 0.93 0.70 0.91
1 Banks are classiﬁed as L-Bound if they were legally bound in one or more reserve maintenance periods during 1992 H2; if not, they are classiﬁed as L-Nonbound.
Banks are classiﬁed as small if their net transaction deposits did not exceed the low reserve tranche ($40.4 million) in any reserve maintenance period during
1990 H2, and are classiﬁed as medium or regional if their average level of net transaction deposits during 1990 H2 did not exceed $125 million or $500 million,
respectively. Banks with net transaction deposits averaging more than $500 million during 1990 H2 are classiﬁed as large.   
2 Banks are classiﬁed as L-Bound if they were legally bound in all 39 reserve maintenance periods in 1990 H2, 1991 H2 and 1992 H2; if not, they are classiﬁed as
L-Nonbound. Size criteria are the same as in the previous footnote. cash, we anticipated little reaction to the
reductions in reserve-requirement ratios.
Although there is some variety in effects
for individual banks, the distributions for
L-Nonbound banks generally are
symmetric about zero, for both the 1990-
91 changes (panels A and C) and the 1992
change (panels B and D).
Repeated-Measures Analysis of
Variance
The panel, or longitudinal, structure
of our data requires attention to the 
implied covariance structure of the data-
generating process. Each bank in our
sample is observed for 13 reserve mainte-
nance periods in each of three years, 1990,
1991, and 1992. As such, it seems unlikely
that the disturbances in our ANOVA
models, eijt, are independent and
identically distributed. If they are not, the
coefﬁcient estimates are unbiased and inef-
ﬁcient, while the estimated covariance
matrix is biased and inconsistent. An
appropriate covariance structure likely
would be block-diagonal, with a separate
block for each bank. A test for the
responses of depository institutions which
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0.060incorporates this block-diagonal covar-
iance structure may be constructed by
viewing the banks as if they were clinical
subjects engaged in a laboratory ex-
periment. It is commonplace in clinical
studies to measure certain characteristics
of subjects both pre- and post-treatment,
asking whether the change in the measure-
ment for each subject, when averaged
across all subjects, is statistically sig-
niﬁcant. Since there are multiple obser-
vations on each subject, the models are
widely referred to as repeated measures
models.35 In these models, the repeated
observations for each subject are treated as
multiple time series, and the disturbance is
assumed to be multivariate normal.
In our data, we observe the ratio of
base money to net transaction deposits for
each bank during thirteen reserve mainte-
nance periods in each of three years: 1990,
1991 and 1992. In the repeated measures
ANOVA, the observations for each year are
treated as thirteen realizations of a single
time series process; pooled across the three
years, the observations are regarded as a
multiple time series process composed of
three univariate processes. The data for 
35See Crowder and Hand
(1990), Diggle, Liang and
Zeger (1994), or Davidian and
Giltinan (1995). An earlier ref-
erence is Hsiao (1986).
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1996
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
31














































c. Large Bound Banks, N=49 d. Large Bound Banks, N=49








































0.0601990-91 form a pre- and post-treatment
contrast for the 1990-91 reserve require-
ment reduction, and the data for 1991-92
form a similar contrast for the April 1992
reduction. Inferences regarding the re-
sponse of various groups of banks to the
reserve requirement changes are made by
testing for the existence of signiﬁcant
interaction effects across years between
(and among) each individual year’s reserve
maintenance-period effects.
Repeated measures ANOVA results are
shown in Table 6 and in Figures 9 and 10.
Two tests are shown in each of Parts A and 
B in the table. The ﬁrst is based on an esti-
mated multivariate ANOVA, or MANOVA,
model wherein the dependent variable is
the vector [yij,90, yij,91, yij,92]¢, the explanatory
variables are dummy variables
representing each reserve maintenance
period and the presence of a required
clearing balance contract, and the
disturbance vector for each bank is
assumed multivariate normal without any
restrictions on its covariance matrix. The
value of Wilks’ lambda, a multivariate
analog of more familiar F-tests, suggests
rejection of the hypothesis that coefﬁcients
on the period dummy variables are the
same in all three equations. The second 
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a. Small Nonbound Banks, N=2209 b. Small Nonbound Banks, N=2209




































































c. Medium Nonbound Banks, N=45
1990 vs. 1991


























0test shown in the table is based on an esti-
mated single-equation regression that
includes interaction effects between the
reserve-maintenance period dummy vari-
ables and the year dummy variables (for
1990 and 1991, relative to 1992). The null
hypothesis of no year effects is again
strongly rejected. The test statistics shown
in Parts A and B of Table 6 reinforce the
inferences obtained from the ﬁxed-effects
ANOVAs:  L-Nonbound banks also were E-
Nonbound at the time of the 1990-91
reduction, and larger L-Bound institutions
responded more strongly to the reductions
than did smaller banks.
Our ﬁnal repeated measures test is
graphical, shown in Figures 9 and 10. 
The test is based on the differences 
Dij,91 = yij,912yij,90 and Dij,92 = yij,922yij,91, 
respectively, where yijt is the ratio of base
money to net transaction deposits held by
depository institution i in reserve mainte-
nance period j, j = 1,...13, during year t, 
t = 90, 91, 92. Letting D•jt denote the mean
of the Dijt for maintenance period j, (t = 91,
92) then under suitable regularity condi-
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Table 6
Test Statistics for Repeated Measures ANOVA Models
Null Hypothesis: No Year-Period Interaction Effect for 1990, 1991 and 1992
L-Bound Banks L-Nonbound Banks
Statistic Small  Medium Regional Large Small Medium
A.  Classiﬁed on Legal Reserve Status in 1992 and on Size in 19901
MANOVA Model 
Wilks’ Lambda
Value of statistic 0.996 0.909 0.957 0.775 0.982 0.924
F Value 2.02 25.1 2.67 6.52 20.1 1.77
(degrees of freedom) (24, 27310) (24, 12262) (24, 2902) (24, 1150) (24, 52990) (24, 1054)
p-value 0.0023 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.013
Univariate ANOVA
F Value 1.98 27.8 1.51 5.92 20.45 1.75
(degrees of freedom) (24, 27312) (24, 12264) (24, 2904) (24, 1152) (24, 52992) (24, 1056)
p-value 0.0029 0.0001 0.0543 0.0001 0.0001 0.014
B.  Classiﬁed on Legal Reserve Status in 1990, 1991 and 1992, and on Size in 19902
MANOVA Model 
Wilks’ Lambda
Value of statistic 0.982 0.891 0.952 0.768 0.997 0.942
F Value 2.13 18.8 2.84 6.05 4.99 7.32
(degrees of freedom) (24, 5638) (24, 7558) (24, 2710) (24, 1030) (24, 74662) (24, 5758)
p-value 0.0011 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Univariate ANOVA
F Value 2.67 20.3 1.52 6.10 3.62 7.57
(degrees of freedom) (24, 5640) (24, 7560) (24, 2712) (24, 1032) (24, 74664) (24, 5760)
p-value 0.0001 0.0001 0.0522 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001             
1 Banks are classiﬁed as L-Bound if they were legally bound in one or more reserve maintenance periods during 1992 H2; if not, they are classiﬁed as L-Nonbound.
Banks are classiﬁed as small if their net transaction deposits did not exceed the low reserve tranche ($40.4 million) in any reserve maintenance period during
1990 H2, and are classiﬁed as medium or regional if their average level of net transaction deposits during 1990 H2 did not exceed $125 million or $500 million,
respectively. Banks with net transaction deposits averaging more than $500 million during 1990 H2 are classiﬁed as large.   
2 Banks are classiﬁed as L-Bound if they were legally bound in all 39 reserve maintenance periods in 1990 H2, 1991 H2 and 1992 H2; if not, they are classiﬁed as
L-Nonbound. Size criteria are the same as in the previous footnote. tions a (1002
 
g) percent conﬁdence inter-




g)/2 is the [(11
 
g)/2]th quantile of
the t distribution with n-1 degrees of
freedom.36 These conﬁdence intervals are
plotted as horizontal line segments in Fig-
ures 9 and 10. The length of each line
segment shows the width of the
conﬁdence interval, the numbers on the
vertical axis index the reserve maintenance
period j, and the means D•jt are indicated
by the large dots on each line. We show
the conﬁdence intervals graphically (rather
than reporting signiﬁcance levels or p-
values for rejection/acceptance of the null
hypothesis of no response to a change in
the reserve requirement ratio) because
inferences drawn from a graphical presen-
tation likely are more robust to deviations
from the regularity conditions that justify
use of the (asymptotic) t-distribution in
construction of the intervals. A graphical
presentation also is somewhat easier to
interpret than classical test statistics when
between-bank, within-group variances are
small, as reﬂected in the short length of
the conﬁdence intervals.
Figure 9 shows banks’ responses to the
1990-91 reduction in reserve-requirement
ratios. The results are clear:  L-Bound
banks, shown in the second row of the
ﬁgure, reduced their holdings of base
money relative to net transaction deposits
by about 20.02, close to the estimates

















































36See for example Mood, Graybill
and Boes (1974), p. 387.
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Confidence Intervals
For the Difference between 1990 and 1991 Monetary Base-to-Net Transaction Deposit Ratios.











































































































































































































12Nonbound institutions did not respond.
Of special interest is the conﬁdence inter-
val for the change between the thirteenth
reserve maintenance periods in 1990 and
in 1991. The reserve-requirement reduc-
tion was phased in, with only one-half of
the reduction in force during the ﬁnal
reserve maintenance period of 1990. E-
Bound banks would be expected to respond
to the phased reduction by displaying a
smaller response for this thirteenth period
than for the other twelve periods. Such a
response is distinct for L-Bound banks and
absent for L-Nonbound banks. We conclude
that:  (1) L-Nonbound depository institu-
tions likely were E-Nonbound before the
1990-91 reduction, and hence should be
excluded from RAM; and (2) L-Bound
institutions generally were E-Bound, and
responded as expected to the reduction in
requirements.
Figure 10 shows similar intervals for
the April 1992 reduction in reserve require-
ments. Small and medium-size L-Non-
bound and L-Bound banks did not
respond: their conﬁdence intervals either
include, or are very close to, the origin.
Although larger L-Bound banks reduced
their holdings of base money, on average
their response was less than the 0.02
reduction in the statutory requirement.
The less-than-proportionate response per-
haps reﬂects the falling federal funds rate;
it might also be signalling, however, that
the banks were becoming, or had become,
E-Nonbound. The latter hypothesis is sup-
ported by the observation that, by the end
of 1992, about half of these banks had
agreed, through required clearing balance
contracts, to maintain Federal Reserve
deposits in excess of amounts necessary to
satisfy their statutory reserve requirements.
We conclude that by the end of 1992 only
a small number of U.S. depository institu-
tions found statutory reserve requirements
governing their demand for base money.
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Confidence Intervals
For the Difference between 1991 and 1992 Monetary Base-to-Net Transaction Deposit Ratios.












































































































































































































The evidence presented in this article
suggests that depository institutions’
demand for the monetary base has
changed sharply since implementation of
the Monetary Control Act in 1980.
Increasingly, depository institutions are
maintaining deposits at Federal Reserve
Banks to settle interbank payments, not to
satisfy statutory required reserves.
Measures of the monetary base must be
expanded to include all the deposits held
by domestic depository institutions at Fed-
eral Reserve Banks. The exclusion of the
nominal amount of required clearing bal-
ance contracts from the old St. Louis
measure and from the Board of Governors’
measure, albeit perhaps justiﬁed in the
early 1980s, is today incorrect.
The importance of statutory reserve
requirements as a determinant of
depository institutions’ demand for base
money also has diminished since 1980. If
the adjusted monetary base is to remain
interpretable as an index of quantitative
monetary policy actions, care must be
exercised when combining the effects of
changes in reserve requirements with
changes in the monetary base. In
particular, the RAM adjustment included
in the St. Louis adjusted monetary base
must be redeﬁned so as to include only
those depository institutions that respond
to changes in statutory reserve
requirements by changing their holdings
of base money, or in other words, are E-
Bound. Both the apparently less than
dollar-for-dollar adjustment of many large
banks to the April 1992 reduction in
reserve requirements and the continuing
spread of OCD-based sweep programs sug-
gest that few, if any, depository institutions
will be E-Bound in the future.
[Editor’s Note:  In September 1996, the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis began
publishing the new adjusted monetary
base measure that is presented in this
paper.]
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